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I. INTRODUCTION
As interest in clean energy continues to grow throughout
communities in the United States and energy reliability issues consistently
plague the power grid, localizing the energy needs of communities through
development of local distributed generation systems is key to improving
the reliability, sustainability, and independence of community electricity
needs. By utilizing existing incentives through the proper implementation
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”) and
simultaneously enacting community power legislation, communities can
begin to move towards localized energy independence1 that is reliable,
resilient, and clean.
State public service commissions2 (“PSCs”), the state agencies
that oversee implementation of PURPA and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) applicable regulations, play a critical
role in promoting localized energy independence because they have
significant authority over how PURPA’s incentives for local clean energy
projects are carried out within a state. While proper state PSC
implementation of PURPA and FERC regulations plays a major role in
local clean energy development, state legislatures also have a critical role
in enabling and incentivizing the development of local clean energy
projects via the enactment of community power legislation. Taken
together, positive action by state PSCs and state legislatures towards
1.
Localized energy independence relates to the goal of communities
increasing their reliance on locally-sourced and, ideally, locally-owned power.
2.
PSCs oversee the rates and services provided by utilities, including
electricity, natural gas, water, waste management, telecommunications, and
transportation. The naming of PSCs vary by state and are also known as “public utility
commissions” or “utility regulatory commissions,” among others.
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enabling development of distributed generation power projects can help
communities initiate development of localized energy independence
leading to a cleaner, more resilient, and reliable electricity grid.
There are three main parts to this article: background on PURPA;
discussion of PURPA’s role in boosting local clean energy projects; and
review of existing community power legislation in Colorado and Oregon.
The first part of this paper provides a foundational understanding of
PURPA and how existing FERC regulations, as well as decisions from the
United States Supreme Court and various state Supreme Courts, have
shaped state PSCs’ implementation of PURPA’s benefits. The second part
discusses PURPA’s potential for boosting local clean energy projects by
ensuring that all of the benefits that local clean energy projects provide
utilities and the public are fully accounted for, including a review of recent
steps taken by the Michigan PSC regarding PURPA implementation. In
the final part, this article focuses on community power legislation and
how, through structuring community power legislation to encompass
PURPA’s incentives, such legislation can better help communities realize
local energy independence.

II. PURPA BACKGROUND
On November 9, 1978, to combat the Nation’s excessive
dependence on centralized fossil fuel energy, PURPA was signed into
law.3 In passing PURPA, Congress sought to protect Americans against
the price volatility of fossil fuels and decrease the Nation’s electricity
dependence on fossil fuels by decentralizing and diversifying the Nation’s
energy sources.4 A major goal of PURPA is to encourage the development

3.
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, PUB. L. NO. 95-617,
92 STAT. 3117 (1978) [hereinafter PURPA]; 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2005).
4.
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750 (1982) (noting, “Congress
believed that increased use of these [renewable] sources of energy would reduce the
demand for traditional fossil fuels.”); Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv.
Corp, 461 U.S. 402, 417 (1983) (concluding, “The basic purpose of § 210 of PURPA
was to increase the utilization of cogeneration and small power production facilities
and to reduce reliance on fossil fuels.”); S. Cal. Edison Co. San Diego Gas & Electric
Co., 71 FERC ¶ 61269, 62079 (FERC June 2, 1995) (finding “Congress was seeking
to diversify the Nation's generation fuel mix and promote more efficient use of fossil
fuels when they were used for generation by encouraging renewable technologies and
cogeneration, in order to cushion against further price shock and reduce dependence
on fossil fuels.”).
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of cogeneration and small power production facilities.5 Small power
production facilities, the focus of this paper, are facilities that use biomass,
waste, or renewable resources (such as wind, water, or solar energy) to
produce electric power.6 Small power production facilities qualify for
PURPA benefits if they are 80 megawatts (“MWs”) or less, these facilities
are known as qualifying facilities (“QFs”).7
Overall, to accomplish its purpose and goals, PURPA aims to remove
major barriers to market competition for QFs and encourage their
development by simulating a free and open market and allowing
independent power producers access to tightly guarded electricity markets
of monopoly utilities.8 As appropriately summarized by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, PURPA’s purpose is to “compel regulated electric
utilities to purchase needed power from [QF] sources instead of building
additional capacity or acquiring power from other regulated utilities.”9 In
other words, every action under PURPA must be viewed through the lens
of whether the action taken “encourage[s]” QF development, as required
under 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a), since encouraging QF development is the
primary purpose of PURPA.
Prior to PURPA, three major barriers blocked the sale of
electricity to utilities by small power production facilities. The first barrier
was reluctance by traditional monopoly electric utilities to purchase power
from small power production facilities at appropriate rates that would
cover the cost of production and allow for sustainable economic returns
for small power production facility owners—this is the primary barrier and
is still a major barrier affecting small-scale clean energy development
today.10 The second barrier PURPA seeks to breakdown involves utilities
discriminatorily charging excessive rates to small power production
facilities for back-up service, which is energy made available to a facility
in the event of an unscheduled outage.11 The third barrier discouraging
5.
18 C.F.R. § 292.204(a); Am. Paper Inst., 461 U.S. at 405 (noting
Congress’ belief that demand for fossil fuel energy would be reduced by requiring
purchases from qualifying cogeneration and small power production facilities).
6.
16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A) (2005).
7.
Am. Paper Inst., 461 U.S. at 405; 18 C.F.R. § 292.204(a).
8.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 750–51.
9.
Pa. Elec. Co. v. Pa. Puc, 544 Pa. 475, 477, 677 A.2d 831, 832 (1996).
10.
Small Power Production and Cogeneration Facilities; Regulations
Implementing § 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 45 Fed.
Reg. 12,214-02, 12,215 (Feb. 25, 1980) (hereinafter “FERC Order No. 69”);
Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 750–51; see e.g. Vote Solar v. Mont. Dep’t Pub. Serv. Reg.,
473 P.3d 963 (Mont. 2020); MTSUN v. Mont. Dep’t Pub. Serv. Reg., 472 P.3d 1154
(Mont. 2020).
11.
FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,214-02, 12,215.
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small power production development included financial burdens imposed
by state and federal regulations, such as certain provisions in the Federal
Power Act (“FPA”), the Public Utility Holding Company Act
(“PUHCA”), and state laws regulating electric utility rates and financial
organization.12
PURPA introduced three primary mechanisms to overcome these
barriers.13 To defeat the first barrier, § 210 of PURPA imposes a
mandatory purchase obligation on utilities and requires that utility
purchase rates of electricity generated by QFs be “just and reasonable to
the electric consumers... and in the public interest” and that the rates do
not “discriminate against [QFs].”14 Further, § 210 directs FERC to
prescribe and, when needed, revise legally enforceable rules as needed to
“encourage cogeneration and small power production.”15
Using that authority and aiming to overcome the first barrier, FERC
promulgated regulations outlining that utilities are obligated to purchase
energy and capacity from QFs at the utility’s full “avoided cost,” which is
further explained in part I(B) below, or at a negotiated avoided cost rate
for certain QFs.16 To defeat the second barrier, FERC promulgated a
regulation that provides QFs with the right to purchase certain services
from utilities (back-up and maintenance power) at rates which are just and
reasonable.17 FERC’s regulations also provides QFs with the right to
interconnect with the utility’s transmission and distribution lines at a
nondiscriminatory interconnection fee.18
As for defeating the third barrier, § 210(e) of PURPA directs FERC to
issue rules that exempt QFs from burdensome federal and state laws
relating to electricity utilities.19

12.
Id.; Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 750–51.
13 . Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, What Are the Benefits of QF
Status?, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/qf (last updated Dec. 29, 2017).
14.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a), (b), (f), (h) (2005).
15.
Id. (emphasis added).
16.
18 C.F.R. §§ 292.303–304 (Under 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.309–311, certain
utilities are relieved from § 292.304 requirements by showing nondiscriminatory
market access exists.).
17.
18 C.F.R. §§ 292.305–306.
18.
Id.
19.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (2005) (To date, FERC has exempted QFs of
30 MWs or smaller to the PUHCA, most sections of the FPA (except section 205, 206,
and 207 which exemptions only apply to QFs with 20 MWs or less), and state laws
and regulations governing rates, finances, and organizational aspects of utilities. See
18 C.F.R. §§ 292.601–602.).

204

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 44

A. PURPA Implementation: A Balancing Act
Between FERC and State PSCs
Though PURPA provides FERC with the authority to prescribe
rules that set the boundaries for PURPA implementation throughout the
nation, FERC’s actual implementation power is limited since PURPA
reserves discretion to PSCs to determine how FERC’s regulations should
be implemented in its respective state.20 This reservation of authority is
particularly important because it essentially results in PSCs having the
discretion to define what is reasonable and nondiscriminatory in the
context of developing avoided cost rates and interconnection fees,
allowing its actions don’t implicate PURPA’s baseline requirements and
that they are “reasonably designed to give effect to FERC’s rules.”21
Therefore, while FERC may issue regulations that aim to encourage
development of QFs, PSCs have the authority over actual binding
implementation of PURPA and how FERC’s regulations are carried out
within their respective state. Throughout the U.S., this delegated authority
means the difference between some PSCs implementing PURPA and
FERC’s rules to actually expand and encourage development of QFs, and
some PSCs implementing PURPA on a bare minimum level that arguably
have the end result of discouraging QF development, contrary to PURPA’s
most basic purpose of “encouraging” QF development.
While FERC has generally issued regulations to fulfill PURPA’s
goal of encouraging QF development, its landmark regulation being Order
No. 69 in 1982, FERC recently finalized a new rulemaking, Order No.
872, in July 2020.22 Although Order No. 872 was dubbed by the majority
Republican commissioners as “modernizing PURPA,”23 its more accurate
moniker is a “gutting of PURPA.” As FERC Commissioner Richard Glick
appropriately summarized in his dissent:
I dissent in part from today’s final rule because it
effectively guts the Commission’s implementation of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). The
Commission’s basic responsibilities under PURPA are
20.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 751 (1982).
21.
Id.
22.
Federal Energy Reg. Comm’n, Final Order No. 872, FERC (July 16,
2020), https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/07-2020-E-1.pdf.
23.
Federal Energy Reg. Comm’n, FERC Modernizes PURPA Rules to
Ensure Compliance, Reflect Today’s Markets, FERC (July 16, 2020), https://www.
ferc.gov/news-events/news/ferc-modernizes-purpa-rules-ensure-compliance-reflect
-todays-markets.
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three-fold: (1) to encourage the development of
qualifying facilities (QFs); (2) to prevent discrimination
against QFs by incumbent utilities; and (3) to ensure that
the resulting rates paid by electricity customers remain
just and reasonable, in the public interest, and do not
exceed the incremental costs to the utility of alternative
energy. I do not believe that today’s Final Rule satisfies
those responsibilities. Instead, the Final Rule raises as
many questions as it answers, not least of which is the
long-term legal viability of an approach that does so little
to encourage QF development.24
Indeed, Commissioner Glick’s full dissent summarized each
aspect of where Order No. 872 violated PURPA by effectively dismantling
rules that have acted to encourage QF development for decades in favor of
rules that will undoubtedly discourage their development. Perhaps the
most egregious action by FERC in Order No. 872 was the elimination of
the requirement under 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2) that states allow QFs to
choose between an available or variable rate calculated at the time of
delivery or a contract option that provides for fixed avoided cost payments
over a term of years.25 It is a general consensus among QF developers that
a variable rate is not a financeable rate and most, if not all, QF developers
choose the fixed rate over a term of years option for its avoided cost
payments. The easiest way to compare this change is to a home mortgage.
When presented with a choice of a 30-year or 15-year mortgage, most
choose 30, and when presented with the option of choosing a variable
interest rate, most choose a fixed interest rate on their loan due to the
uncertainty of a variable rate.
In states where PSCs have been diligently working to kill QF
development, undoubtedly, they are giddy over the prospects of stripping
QFs of their ability to have a fixed rate over a term of years. However,
doing so in certain states where the utility is vertically integrated is likely
unlawful and contrary to PURPA’s anti-discrimination provision at 16
U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(2). As Commissioner Glick correctly noted, “fixedprice contracts have helped prevent discrimination against QFs by
ensuring that they are not structurally disadvantaged relative to vertically
24.
Federal Energy Reg. Comm’n, Commissioner Richard Glick Dissent
in Part Regarding Qualifying Facility Rates and Requirements Implementation Issues
Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, FERC (July 16, 2020),
https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/commissioner-richard-glick-dissent-part
-regarding-qualifying-facility-rates-and/ [hereinafter, “Glick Order No. 872 Dissent”].
25.
Final Order No. 872, 172 FERC ¶ 61,041, ¶ 253.
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integrated utilities that are guaranteed to recover the costs of their
prudently incurred investments through retail sales.”26 Vertically
integrated utilities are those that own and control generation, transmission,
and distribution components of electricity and are largely utilities
operating in the southeastern and western United States.27 In other words,
a PSC’s action of upending fixed price contracts for QFs in states where
the utility is a vertically integrated utility that receives a guaranteed fixed
rate of return or cost recovery from its ratepayers—like utilities operating
in the southeastern and much of the western United States, including
Montana’s primary utility—would likely be found to be unlawful and
contrary to PURPA’s anti-discrimination provision on avoided cost rate
calculations.28 Accordingly, in states where the utility is a vertically
integrated utility, the state PSCs may want to think twice before they jump
on the Order No. 872 bandwagon and upending fixed-price contracts.29

B. The Importance of PURPA Today
Despite some recent calls to repeal or reform PURPA and FERC’s
Order No. 872 effective gutting of PURPA, PURPA’s purpose to diversify
the nation’s energy sources and increase small power production is equally
relevant today as it was in the 1970s because the need to diversify and
26.
Glick Order No. 872 Dissent, supra note 24.
27.
Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Vertically Integrated Utility,
(2020), https://hepg.hks.harvard.edu/faq/vertically-integrated-utility; Seth Blumsack,
Introduction to Electricity Markets: 1.3 Major Players in the Electric Power Sector,
Penn State University, https://www.e-education.psu.edu/ebf483/node/641.
28.
See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(2); Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 969, 976, 982
(describing the guaranteed cost-recovery or rate of return of Montana’s major utility
that is vertically integrated).
29.
Moreover, notwithstanding the likelihood that upending fixed
contracts for QFs operating in vertically integrated utility territories would be found
contrary to PURPA, several other factors dictate that jumping on the Order No. 872
bandwagon may be premature. First, there is ongoing litigation surrounding the
lawfulness of FERC Order No. 872 itself that could result in setting aside the entirety
of Order No. 872. See Montana Env. Info. Ctr. et. al v. FERC, Case No. 21-70083
(Filed Jan. 14, 2021, Ninth Cir.); SEIA v. FERC, Case No. 20-72788 (Filed Sept. 18,
2020, 9th Cir.). Second, it is possible that when the majority on FERC shifts from a
3–2 Republican majority to a 3–2 Democratic majority in June 2021, Order No. 872
could be either rescinded or effectively nullified. See Bracewell LLP, Things Looking
Up for Renewable Resources at Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Feb. 10,
2021), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6502f1f7-35fe-4745-b18b
-41cd4c243589; Sidley Austin LLP, What a Biden Administration Means for the
Energy Sector (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
36838566-ce16-4ef9-bb64-7d9f169f4044.
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decentralize the nation’s power sources still exists. With the help of
PURPA, production and consumption of clean energy has increased
significantly in the last ten years in the United States, exceeding coal
consumption.30 While PURPA QF projects comprise a smaller annual
percentage of overall renewable energy development across the United
States (between ten to 40 percent, depending on the year), the cumulative
gigawatt capacity of PURPA QF projects has more than doubled in the last
decade.31 Importantly, in certain states (it appears largely those states
where the operating utility is vertically integrated), PURPA QF projects
comprise a significant percentage of new wind and solar development,
including North Carolina where 92 percent of all solar generation is QF
certified32 and Montana where close to 50 percent of wind and solar
projects are QFs.33
In other words, clearly PURPA remains an important and relevant
law today in the United States, particularly in states where the monopoly
utility, sometimes with the help of the state utility commission, continues
to impose excessive and unlawful barriers to renewable energy
development by independent power producers resulting in QFs failing to
have nondiscriminatory access to the market.34 Even with PURPA’s goal
30.
EIA, U.S. renewable energy consumption surpasses first time in over
130 years, (May 28, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=43895.
31.
EIA, North Carolina has more PURPA-qualifying solar facilities
than any other state, (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php
?id=27632#:~:text=North%20Carolina%20has%20more%20PURPA%2Dqualifying
%20solar%20facilities%20than%20any%20other%20state,-Source%3A%20U.S.%2
0Energy&text=Currently%2C%201%2C173%20MW%2C%20or%2092,both%20ab
solute%20and%20percentage%20terms.
32.
Id.
33.
As provided in the following citations, Montana has around 364 MWs
of QF generation and a capacity of around 800 MWs, resulting in a QF percentage of
about 46 percent of wind and solar resource generation in Montana. See National
Regulatory
Research
Institute,
PURPA
Tracker,
NARUC
(2021),
https://www.naruc.org/nrri/nrri-activities/purpa-tracker; see also EIA, Montana: State
Profile and Energy Estimates (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/state/
analysis.php?sid=MT#117.
34.
One reason for a decline in overall number of PURPA projects is that
in 2005, Congress enacted an amendment to PURPA, 16 U.S.C. § 8241-3(m) that
exempted electric utilities who operate in an independent market that is administered
by an independent body (i.e. Independent System Operators or “ISOs”) from
PURPA’s mandatory purchase obligations, meaning those utility’s whose operations
are not vertically integrated. Vertically integrated utilities have a monopoly on market
access and via restrictive actions cane effectively limit independent power producers’
access to the market in their territory, which emphasizes the continued relevance and
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of breaking down barriers imposed by monopoly utilities so as to ensure
an open market exists in the power generation sector, non-discriminatory
access to the monopoly utility markets remains challenging.
Moreover, notwithstanding the progress of renewable energy
generation with the help of PURPA, the Nation still continues to be heavily
reliant on fossil fuels.35 As of 2017, fossil fuels (namely coal and natural
gas) comprise about sixty-three percent of the total share of United States
electricity generation, nuclear makes up 20 percent, and renewables
(including hydropower) total only around 17 percent.36 Accordingly,
overreliance on centralized power and fossil fuels still plagues the country
as the overdependence on fossil fuels leads to increases in the risk of price
volatility of electricity,37 climate change impacts,38 public health
consequences,39 expensive weather and climate disasters that disrupt
centralized power,40 in addition to national security implications.41
Therefore, PURPA is still highly relevant today as it clearly continues to
be needed to help decrease the nation’s dependence on fossil fuels through

importance of PURPA today. See Advanced Energy Economy, How Much Do You
Know About Your Electric Utility (Feb. 17, 2015), https://blog.aee.net/how-much-do
-you-know-about-your-electric-utility#:~:text=The%20traditional%20definition%20
of%20a,production%20and%20sale%20of%20power.
35.
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Table 10: Renewable Energy Production
and Consumption by Source, EIA.GOV (Apr. 2018), https://www.eia.gov/
totalenergy/data/monthly/ pdf/sec10_3.pdf.
36.
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., What is U.S. Electricity Generation by
Source, EIA, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (last visited Nov.
17, 2020).
37.
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas: Henry Hub Natural Gas
Spot Price, EIA, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm (last updated May
2, 2018); Jeff Deyette, et. al., The Natural Gas Gamble: A Risky Bet on America’s
Clean Energy Future, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 12–15 (2015),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/03/natural-gas-gamble-full
-report.pdf; Elena M. Krieger, Low fossil fuel prices embody their inherently risky
volatility, THE HILL (2015), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy
-environment/233006-low-fossil-fuel-prices-embody-their-inherently-risky.
38.
Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab, Energy Analysis: Life Cycle
Assessment Harmonization, NREL, https://www.nrel.gov/analysis/life-cycle
-assessment.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
39.
Deyette, supra note 37, at 17–18.
40.
Daniel Shea, State Efforts to Protect the Electric Grid, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2–3 (2016), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/
Documents/energy/ENERGY_SECURITY_REPORT_FINAL_April2016.pdf.
41.
American Council on Renewable Energy, The Role of Renewable
Energy in National Security (Oct. 2018), https://acore.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/
10/ACORE_Issue-Brief-The-Role-of-Renewable-Energy-in-National-Security.pdf.
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encouraging the development of diverse and decentralized small power
production systems.

C. Avoided Costs Requirements of PURPA
To encourage development of QFs, PURPA requires that any
costs paid to a QF for electricity generated are equitable, nondiscriminatory, and are based on the utility’s “full avoided cost.”42
Avoided costs and the contract terms locking in those costs for a period of
years is similar to a utility’s guaranteed rate of return or cost recovery.43
There are two options for developing equitable and non-discriminatory
rates: (1) negotiation between the utility and the QF, which is typically the
route for larger sized QFs; or (2) standardized avoided costs set by PSCs.44
FERC defines “avoided costs” as the “incremental cost to an electric utility
of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for the purchase from the
QF, such utility would generate itself or purchase from another source.”45
Energy avoided costs are the cost savings delivered to the utility by the QF
as a result of the QF reducing the amount of energy needing to be
generated at the utility’s more expensive power plants.46 Capacity avoided
costs occur when a utility is reaching maximum load demand for its
current energy supply throughout its territory and the utility needs
additional power to meet demand, but building a new centralized power
plant would be excessive; thus, the incremental energy that a QF can
provide enables the utility to defer construction of a new power plant
and/or minimize the need for spot-market purchases.47
Standardized avoided costs are set by the PSCs and are required
for QFs 100 kilowatts (kWs) or less, but PSCs have discretion to apply a
standardized avoided cost rate for QFs as large as 80 MWs.48 The
application of standard avoided cost rates vary by state, with some PSCs

42.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2005); Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec.
Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 402 (1983).
43.
Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 982.
44.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a), (m)(6); 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(c), (d); Am.
Paper Inst., Inc., 461 U.S. at 402 (holding that FERC’s action requiring that the utility
must purchase energy from a QF at the full avoided cost was lawful); S. Cal. Edison,
71 FERC at 62080.
45.
18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6).
46
Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, Avoided Cost, IEPA,
https://www.iepa.com/glossary-of-energy-terms/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2020).
47.
Id.
48.
18 C.F.R. §§ 292.204(a), 304(c); FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg.
12,214-02, 12,223.
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applying standardized avoided cost rates to ten MWs, such as in Oregon,49
and others only the minimum of 100 kW.50 Standardized avoided cost rates
are important to smaller QFs (i.e. 20 MWs or less) because the
transactional costs of negotiating rates with the utility could alone render
the small QF uneconomical.51 In calculating standardized avoided costs,
FERC has ordered that avoided cost rates should be set at the utilities full
avoided cost—nothing less, nothing more—an order that has been upheld
by the United States Supreme Court.52 Overall, the standardized avoided
cost component of § 210 of PURPA is critical to diversifying and
decentralizing the Nation’s energy sources, but its impact varies by state
according to the QF size that the standardized rate applies to and the
avoided cost calculation methodology chosen by the PSC.
In calculating avoided costs, FERC provides mandatory and
discretionary guidance to PSCs. According to FERC, there are several
factors that must be taken into account in determining a QF’s avoided cost
rates, including, but not limited to: (1) the usefulness of the QF’s energy
during a system emergency, including its ability to separate its load and
generation; (2) the “individual and aggregate value of energy and capacity
from QFs” to the utility’s system; (3) the QF’s smaller capacity increments
and shorter lead times, which is the time it takes to make, produce, or
deliver energy; (4) the QF’s ability to enable the utility to defer capacity
additions and decrease reliance on fossil fuels; and (5) the utility cost
savings resulting from decreased line losses of energy during transmission
from the QF.53
In addition to these mandatory factors, in 1995 FERC ruled that
environmental costs of fuels should be accounted for in determining the
utilities avoided cost if the costs are real costs that would be incurred by
the utility since those costs are an aspect of the utility’s full avoided
49.
OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, In the Matter of Public Utility Commission
Of Oregon Staff’s Investigation Relating to Electric Utility Purchases from Qualifying
Facilities, Order No. 05-584, 1 (May 13, 2005), http://apps.puc.state.or.us/orders/
2005ords/05-584.pdf (Oregon established a 10 MW threshold for standardized
avoided costs).
50.
Utility Dive, Michigan regulators set new avoided cost rate for
PURPA contracts, (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/Michigan
-regulators-set-new-avoided-cost-rate-for-purpa-contracts/511639/
(Standardized
avoided cost rates in Michigan used to only apply to 100 kW projects prior to a
November 2017 Michigan Public Service Commission order.).
51.
FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. at 12,223.
52.
Id.; Am. Paper Inst., Inc., 461 U.S. at 402 (holding that FERC’s order
requiring utilities to purchase energy from QFs at their full avoided cost was lawful
under PURPA).
53.
18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (2020).
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costs.54 Further, in 2010, FERC held that states may set resource specific
avoided cost rates, meaning the rate may be based on the resource being
proposed by the QF (wind, solar, etc.), rather than other energy sources
(coal, gas, etc.) within the utility’s energy mix.55
1. Types of Avoided Cost Methodologies
In calculating avoided costs, PSCs rely on various methods that
typically always elicit significant debate and argument among regulated
parties. Those methodologies primarily include:
(a) Proxy Method: Bases avoided costs on the projected costs
that the utility would incur from building a hypothetical
power plant, and the amount depends on the cost of the
chosen proxy plant. The avoided cost is based on the fixed
and variable costs of the proxy unit’s generation that the
QF allows the utility to avoid;
(b) Peaker Unit Method: Similar to the proxy method but
assumes that the QF is allowing the utility to avoid paying
for a “marginal generating unit on its system,” meaning a
unit that is able to ramp up and down quickly and only
operates during times that the utility’s load is above its
baseload power production. This methodology is known
to generally undercompensate QFs since while its
variable costs are high (i.e. each time the facility has to
ramp up in response to load spikes), its capital costs are
low (i.e. the costs of running the facility itself, paying for
fuel, maintenance, etc., which is lower since the facility is
only operational on an inconsistent basis);

54.
S. Cal. Edison Co. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 71 FERC ¶ 61,269,
62,080 (F.E.R.C. June 2, 1995); see also Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n.; S. Cal. Edison Co.
P. Gas and Electric Co. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 133 FERC ¶ 61,059, 61,268
(FERC Oct. 21, 2010).
55.
CPUC, 71 FERC at 61,267–68; Carolyn Elefant, Reviving PURPA’s
Purpose: The Limits of Existing State Avoided Cost Ratemaking Methodologies In
Supporting Alternative Energy Development and A Proposed Path for Reform, 2
(2011), http://www.recycled-energy.com/images/uploads/Reviving-PURPA.pdf.
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(c) Differential Revenue Requirement: Calculates the
difference in the utility’s revenue requirements56 with and
without the QF and bases the avoided cost on that
calculation. The avoided energy and capacity costs are
estimated together rather than separately as is done in the
proxy methodology;
(d) Integrated Resource Planning-Based Methodology:
Combined with one of the above methodologies, utilities
base generation mix goals on an IRP;
(e) Competitive Bidding: Open bidding process where the
winning bid is regarded as the avoided cost;
(f) Market-Based Pricing: Applies to QFs with access to
organized competitive markets (i.e. markets ran by
Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent
System Operators, not a monopoly utility) and the QF
receives the avoided cost payments at market rates.57
2. Contract Terms of QF Power Purchase Agreements
In addition to delegating significant authority to PSCs to develop
avoided cost calculations, PURPA also delegates to PSCs the
determination of terms and conditions of the power purchase agreements
(“PPAs”) between the QF and the utility. However, PURPA and FERC

56.
Revenue requirements are the total costs of the utility of meeting its
specified demand/load plus a rate of return or profit. See National Regulatory Research
Institute, The Appropriateness and Feasibility of Various methods of Calculating
Avoided Costs, 95 n.17 (1982), https://ipu.msu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/
NRRI-Appropriatness-Feasibility-June-82-1.pdf.
57.
Carolyn Elefant, Reviving PURPA’s Purpose: The Limits of Existing
State Avoided Cost Ratemaking Methodologies In Supporting Alternative Energy
Development and A Proposed Path for Reform, 26–27 (2011), http://www.recycledenergy.com/images/uploads/Reviving-PURPA.pdf; Victor B. Flatt, et al., Federal
Parameters on the Definition of Avoided Cost Under PURPA and Legal Methods
Currently Used and Acceptable Under PURPA Application for States to Encourage
or Discourage Distributed Generation, UNC CENTER FOR CLIMATE, ENERGY,
ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY &
NATURAL RESOURCES CENTER, 17–23 (July 1, 2017), https://www.law.uh.edu/
eenrcenter/resources/whitepapers/Federal%20Parameters%20on%20State%20Distri
buted %20Generation.pdf.
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regulations provide necessary sideboards.58 While PSCs have authority
over contract lengths, PURPA’s plain language, FERC regulations, and
orders by various PSCs provide some guidance on necessary lengths of
contracts that are needed to encourage QF development so as to allow for
return on investment. First, PURPA requires that PSCs enact rules that are
necessary to encourage production from QFs.59 Arguably, short contract
lengths fail to encourage QF power production and result in projects not
being built since short-term contracts are largely unfinanceable.60
Moreover, PURPA’s anti-discrimination provision, 16 U.S.C. § 824a3(b)(2), arguably provides a sideboard on contract lengths ordered by
PSCs since many utility owned resources, such as the major utility
operating in Montana, “enjoy a guaranteed cost-recovery or rate of return,
which is functionally equivalent to a contract, for at least 25 years.”61
Treating QF projects different than utility owned resources raises the issue
of discriminatory treatment against QFs and preferential treatment for
utility-owned resources by PSCs.62
In reviewing the issue of contract lengths, the Michigan Public
Service Commission recently concluded contract lengths should extend to
a minimum of 20 years to be consistent with PURPA, as this allows the
QF improved access to finances and investment.63 Pre-Order No. 872,
58.
18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(2)(iii); Indep. Energy Producers v. Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the state may consider
contract lengths and terms in calculating avoided cost rates).
59.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3.
60.
Dr. Jurgen Weiss and Dr. Mark Sarro, The Importance of Long-term
Contracting for Facilitating Renewable Energy Project Development, THE BRATTLE
GROUP, 18–19 (May 7, 2013), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/View
Doc.aspx?DocRefId=%7B530BEAA7-6E02-4256-BBA3-04AB7EB7831B%7D;
Robert Walton, BNEF: Shorter contracts could put PURPA solar projects at financial
risk, UTILITY DIVE (Nov. 29, 2016) https://www.utilitydive.com/news/bnef-shorter
-contracts-could-put-purpa-solar-projects-at-financial-risk/431232/.
61.
Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 982.
62.
Indeed, at the time of drafting this article, amendments to PURPA
were under consideration in Congress, including an amendment to 16 U.S.C. § 824a3 that explicitly provides: “The Commission [FERC] shall require that qualifying
facilities have the option to enter a fixed price contract whose term is at least as long
as the term on which the incumbent utility recovers invests in new generation[.]”
CLEAN Future Act, H.R. ____, 117th Cong. § 224 (2021). Such an amendment would
not only put an end to the debate on exactly how long a long-term contract is, but
would also effectively put the nullify FERC Order No. 872’s action of gutting fixed
contracts.
63.
MICH. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, In the matter on the Commission’s own
motion establishing the method and avoided cost calculation for Consumers Energy
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FERC also agreed that long-term contracts are necessary to encourage QF
production, as FERC found that they provide for certainty in regard to
return on investment and they allow for any overestimations or
underestimations of avoided costs to “balance out” over time.64 By
ensuring avoided cost payments over a long-term contract, QFs are
provided with a “certainty of an arrangement” that provides stability to the
contract and attracts investors since the QF’s rate of return does not
undergo variations due to changed circumstances,65 such as short-term
fluctuations in the market cost of electricity. Further, long-term contracts
may also benefit the utility should avoided costs turn out to be higher than
those decided on in the contract.66
Overall, the length of the PPA contract between the QF and the
electric utility is an important factor in encouraging development of QFs
and is critical to securing financing for project development. The longer
the contract,67 the greater benefits to QF development prospects via
improved return on investment certainty and increased capital investor

Company to fully comply with the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16
U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., Case No. U-18090, 21–22 (May 31, 2017),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mpsc/u-18090_5_31_2017_579172_7.pdf.
64.
FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,214-02, 12,224 (Feb. 25, 1980).
65.
Id.
66.
Id.; see also Conn. Valley Elec. Co., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Claremont
Co., L.P., 82 FERC ¶ 61,116, 61,419–20 (1998), denying reconsideration and reh’g
and granting clarification, 83 FERC ¶ 61,136, aff’d sub nom; Conn. Valley Elec. Co.
v. FERC, 208 F.3d 1037 (2000) (ruling that modification of contracts between QFs
and utilities in the event a party claims the economic assumptions changed is
unacceptable).
67.
Long-term contracts are typically defined as those PPAs that are 15–
30 years long , with an apparent general agreement among the renewable energy

community that 20-years or greater (depending on financial and developmental
circumstances) is typically required for renewable energy projects to achieve
adequate return on investment so as to provide for sufficient certainty for capital
investors and allow for actual project development. . See David Feldman, Mark
Bolinger, and Paul Schwabe, Current and Future Costs of Renewable Energy Project
Finance
Across
Technologies,
NREL,
2
(July
2020),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy20osti/
76881.pdf; M. Bolinger and J. Steel, Utility-Scale Solar, Empirical Trends in Project
Technology, Cost, Performance, and PPA pricing in the United States – 2018 Edition,
LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY, 31 n.39 (Sept. 2018),
https://escholarship.org/content/qt5rc3j8cj/qt5rc3j8cj.pdf; U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, 2018 Wind Technologies Market
Report, 58 n.64 (Aug. 2019), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/08/f65/
2018%20Wind%20Technologies%20Market%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
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interest.68 Indeed, long-term PPAs (i.e. 20-years or longer depending on
development circumstances) are critical to the encouragement of QF
development since a “significant portion of current financial risk to
renewable energy generation plants is mitigated by long-term, fixed
contracts.”69 Long-term contracts have been identified as “the most
important factor that can provide [investor] confidence” and allow for
project development.70 Importantly, while the price volatility of fossil fuelbased generation puts ratepayers at risk in long-term PPAs, renewable
energy projects “have little to no fuel risks,” as opposed to fossil fuelbased resources, “and are able to contract electricity for much longer
periods—typically 10-30 years” with minimal risk to ratepayers since the
costs of renewable energy generation generally remain stable throughout
the life of the contract.71
Contrary to long-term contracts, shorter contract lengths72 provide
less price certainty for renewable energy projects and increase risk for a
given project’s lenders and investors, ultimately increasing the cost of
capital for a given project and discouraging QF development.73 Indeed,
since renewable energy projects have high upfront costs, short-term
contracts present many financing challenges. Specifically, short-term
68.
Weiss, supra note 60; see also David Feldman and Paul Schwabe,
Terms, Trends, and Insights: PV Project Finance in the United States 2017, NREL, 5
(Sept. 2017), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/70157.pdf; see also Chris Groobey,
et. al., Project Finance Primer for Renewable Energy and Clean Tech Projects,
WILSON, SONSINI, GOODRICH & ROSATI, 2 (Aug. 2010), https://www.wsgr.com/
PDFSearch/ctp_guide.pdf.
69.
David Feldman, Mark Bolinger, and Paul Schwabe, Current and
Future Costs of Renewable Energy Project Finance Across Technologies, NREL, 30
(July 2020), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy20osti/76881.pdf; see also Developers can cut
costs of renewable energy ‘if offered longer contracts and long-term visibility,’
RECHARGE NEWS (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.rechargenews.com/wind/
developers-can-cut-cost-of-renewable-energy-if-offered-longer-contracts-and-long
-term-visibility/2-1-922568 (indicating that a minimum of a 20-year PPA, rather than
15-year, is necessary to minimize risk and costs related to renewable energy
development).
70.
Weiss, supra note 60, at 18–19 (emphasis added).
71.
Feldman et. al, supra note 69, at 8.
72.
Short-term PPA lengths depend on the ultimate avoided cost amount
paid to the developer but appear to generally be viewed as contract lengths less than
15 years. See U.S. Department of Energy Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable
Energy, 2018 Wind Technologies Market Report, 58 n.64 (Aug. 2019), https://www.
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/08/f65/2018%20Wind%20Technologies%20Market
%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (finding that 89% of contracts in the empirical analysis
were for terms ranging from 15 to 25 years).
73.
Weiss, supra note 60, at 3, 9, 11–12.
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contracts result in increasing the “degree of uncertainty surrounding the
revenue stream” and “impacts the amount of debt financing it can attract
and the cost of attracting debt financing.”74 Accordingly, without
“obtaining a long-term PPA with some level of revenue assurance based
on power production, a renewable energy project (all else equal) will
attract less and more costly debt and more costly equity than traditional
power project operating in the same wholesale power market” resulting in
a riskier investment and, ultimately, a decreased probability that the
project will be built.75
While the debate over what exactly is a “long-term” contract
continues in PSC proceedings around the nation, empirical analyses
indicate—consistent with the Michigan PSC’s finding discussed above—
that generally a minimum of 20 years, depending on the avoided cost
price and other developmental circumstances, is an appropriate length
to allow for development. An empirical analysis of PPAs in the United
States for utility-scale solar projects found that the mean PPA term is 22.5
years.76 Likewise, an empirical analysis in 2018 for utility-scale wind
projects found that contract terms range from five to 35 years, with 89%
of sampled contracts having terms ranging from 15 to 25 years, a
majority of the sampled projects having a PPA length of at least 20 years,
and an average length for wind projects in the Interior U.S. region
being 23.5 years.77 In other words, actual data from empirical analyses
appear to support the notion that a contract term of at least 20 years is
generally required for wind and solar QFs to be able to achieve a return on
investment and encourage project development consistent with PURPA’s
mandate at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) require QF development be encouraged.
3. The Legally Enforceable Obligation
Among the regulations adopted by FERC in implementing
PURPA is 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d), which gives QFs the right to choose
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
M. Bolinger and J. Steel, Utility-Scale Solar, Empirical Trends in
Project Technology, Cost, Performance, and PPA pricing in the United States – 2018
Edition, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, at 31 n.39 (Sept. 2018),
https://escholarship.org/content/qt5rc3j8cj/qt5rc3j8cj.pdf; see also Weiss, supra note
60, at 17 n.39 (assuming 20 years to be a long-term contract).
77.
U.S. Department of Energy Office of Energy Efficiency &
Renewable Energy, 2018 Wind Technologies Market Report, 58 n.64, 60 (Aug. 2019),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/08/f65/2018%20Wind%20Technologi
es%20Market%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
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whether to sell their power on an “as available” basis with rates calculated
at the time of delivery or pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation
(“LEO”). A LEO is a "non-contractual, but binding commitment from a
QF to sell power to a utility.”78 The LEO concept was developed to
overcome the barrier of utility reluctance to purchase power from QFs as
it is “used to prevent an electric utility from avoiding its PURPA
obligations by refusing to sign a contract, or “from delaying the signing of
a contract, so that a later and lower avoided cost is applicable.”79
Acknowledging the power imbalance between utilities and small
power producers, FERC has made it clear that a LEO is different from a
contract and the “phrase is used to prevent an electric utility from avoiding
its PURPA obligations by refusing to sign a contract, or ‘from delaying
the signing of a contract, so that a later and lower avoided cost is
applicable.’”80 As held by FERC in a 2006 decision, “[t]hat Congress used
the term ‘contract or obligation’ in drafting section 210(m)(6) suggests
that Congress intended that the Commission continue to protect both
contracts and obligations that had not yet ripened into contracts but were
‘in effect or pending approval.’”81
This concept has been a common thread in FERC declaratory
orders regarding different state commissions’ LEO rules. As a general
rule, FERC has rejected tests that create barriers to entry for QFs and that
place the control of LEO formation in the control of the utilities.82
Importantly, “‘the establishment of a LEO turns on ‘the QF's commitment,
and not the utility's actions,’ and when a QF commits itself to sell to an
electric utility, it ‘also commits the electric utility to buy from the QF.'”83
While this concept can be a bit murky, particular given a lawyer's
legal training in contracts (i.e. offer, acceptance, consideration), at bottom
the LEO concept is meant to aid QFs in their development path by
allowing the QF to move forward with reasonable certainty as to its return
on investment since the formation of a LEO results in locking in place the
various factors relevant to total avoided cost calculations based on the date
of the LEO regardless of a monopoly utility’s refusal to negotiate or

78.
Id. at ¶ 6 (citing Cedar Creek Wind, LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,006, 61,023
(Oct. 4, 2011).
79.
Id. (citing Cedar Creek Wind, 137 FERC at 61,024).
80.
MTSUN, ¶ 6 (citing Cedar Creek Wind, LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,006,
61,024 (Oct. 4, 2011)).
81.
Midwest Renewable Energy Projects, LLC, 116 FERC ¶ 61,017,
61,073 (2006).
82.
MTSUN, ¶ 66.
83.
Id. at ¶ 6 (emphasis in original) (citing FLS Energy, Inc., 157 FERC
¶ 61,211, 61,730–31 (2016)).
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stonewalling of the QF.84 While the LEO concept is important for larger
QFs, the concept is generally not applicable to smaller QFs that are entitled
to a standardized avoided cost since the purpose of having a standardized
avoided cost rate is to negate the need of small QFs to negotiate with the
utility and minimize transactional costs.85
4. Consideration of the Public Interest in Setting Avoided Cost Rates
PURPA specifically states that avoided cost rates “shall be just
and reasonable to the electric consumers of the electric utility and in the
public interest.”86 In accounting for the public interest in setting avoided
cost rates, the definition of public interest must be read in the context of
PURPA’s purpose.87 PURPA declares that “the business of transmitting
and selling electric energy for the ultimate distribution to the public is
affected with a public interest.”88 Where statutes use the words “public
interest,” the Supreme Court has ruled that the meaning of public interest
in the statute is directly related to the purpose of the legislation.89 In
considering the public interest in PURPA, PURPA’s purpose encompasses
not only economic interests, such as the cost of electricity to the ratepayer,
but also electricity grid reliability and environmental interests associated
with the financial and public health impacts related to overreliance on
fossil fuel based electricity sources.
Precedent in the Supreme Court, D.C. Circuit, and FERC orders
dictates that the words “public interest” in PURPA allow for consideration
beyond simply economic interests and that they also encompass
environmental and public health and welfare interests in setting avoided
84.
While FERC Order No. 872, as discussed above effectively guts
PURPA, one positive aspect of the Order was that it provided further clarification on
when a QF establishes a LEO. Specifically, it provided that a QF establishes a LEO
when it demonstrates its commercial viability and financial commitment to developing
the project. See FERC Order No. 872, 172 FERC ¶ 61,041, ¶ 684. FERC left states
with the flexibility to determine the criteria for demonstrating commercial viability
and financial commitment (as long as the criteria is “objective and reasonable”), but
provided examples of objective and reasonable criteria, including that the QF has: (1)
taken meaningful steps to obtain site control of the project; (2) filed an interconnection
application with the utility; and (3) has applied for required permitting. See FERC
Order No. 872, ¶ 685. FERC reiterated that “the factors that the state requires must be
factors that are within the control of the QF.” FERC Order No. 872, ¶ 685.
85.
FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. at 12,223.
86.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(1) (emphasis added).
87.
Natl. Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Fed. Power
Comm’n., 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976).
88.
16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2005).
89.
Fed. Power Comm’n., 425 U.S. at 669.
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costs. In FERC v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court noted that part of
PURPA’s purpose was to protect the “public health, safety, and welfare”
and “preserve national security.”90 Additionally, in American Paper
Institute, Inc. v. American Elec. Power Service Corp., the Supreme Court
held that it was in the public’s interest to increase electricity production
from QFs, regardless of the fact it didn’t provide ratepayer cost savings,
because “the entire country will ultimately benefit” from QF energy and
the resulting decreased reliance on fossil fuels.91 Arguably in ensuring that
rates for QFs are set in the “public interest,” it is incumbent on PSCs to
not merely consider economic costs that QFs avoid, but also broader
societal costs that are related to fossil fuel-based electricity.92

III. PURPA’S ROLE IN BOOSTING LOCAL CLEAN ENERGY PROJECTS
As demand for clean energy increases, providing avenues for
development of local community-scale projects, and not only large-scale
rural projects, is an important step towards achieving localized energy
independence. PURPA already plays a critical role in boosting clean
energy projects, however, and through proper implementation of PURPA,
the full benefits of local clean energy projects can result in higher avoided
costs that represent a given utility’s true full avoided cost. Local clean
energy projects, also known as distributed generation (“DG”) systems,
include technologies such as solar panels and wind turbines that generate
electricity on-site or near where the energy is consumed, and range from
less than 100 kWs to ten MWs.93 DG systems can serve residential,
90.
456 U.S. 742, 755 (1982).
91.
461 U.S. 402, 417 (1983).
92.
In relation to electricity production and environmental costs, it is a
well-known fact that the burning of fossil fuels endangers public health, safety, and
welfare due to its contributions to climate change, as well as air pollution.
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 FR 66496–501 (2009) (upheld in Coalition for
Responsible Reg., Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). Moreover, climate
change has severe impacts on national security. See Department of Defense, Report
on the Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense (Jan. 2019),
https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/sec_335_ndaa-report_
effects_of_a_changing_climate_to_dod.pdf; see also The White House, The National
Security Implications of A Changing Climate (May 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/National_Security_Implications_of_Changing_
Climate_Final_051915.pdf.
93.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Distributed Generation of Electricity and
its Environmental Impacts, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/energy/distributed-generation
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commercial, or industrial facilities on-site or can be off-site, as long as the
DG system is still only connected to the grid on the distribution level and
not the transmission level.94 Through smart implementation of avoided
cost methodologies by state utility commissions—coupled with long-term
contracts of 20-years or longer depending on developmental
circumstances, as discussed above—the development of local communityscale DG projects throughout the country can be further enhanced, helping
communities realize localized energy independence along with its many
benefits including increased grid reliability and resiliency.

A. Defining How PSCs Should Set Avoided Cost Ratemaking
Methodologies to Encourage DG Projects
Using avoided cost ratemaking methodologies, PSCs have the
power to enable wide-scale development of community-scale DG projects.
While PURPA and FERC regulations allow for consideration of several
factors that are relevant to encouraging DG projects, PSCs around the
nation fail to consistently apply those factors in developing standardized
avoided cost rates.95 Overall, DG systems provide significant benefits to
the electric grid, utilities, and the public, specifically through avoided line
-electricity-and-its-environmental-impacts (last visited Nov. 17, 2020); Nat’l
Renewable Energy Lab., Energy Analysis: Distributed Generation Renewable Energy
Estimate of Costs, NREL, https://www.nrel.gov/analysis/tech-lcoe-re-cost-est.html
(last updated Feb. 2016); Mahesh Kumar et. al., Optimal Placement and Sizing of
Renewable Distributed Generations and Capacitor Banks into Radial Distribution
Systems, Energies, 16 (see Table 7) (June 14, 2017), http://www.mdpi.com/1996
-1073/10/6/811/pdf-vor.
94.
N.Y. State Energy Research and Dev. Auth., Summary of Value of
Distributed Energy Resources, NYSERDA, https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/-/media/
NYSun/files/VDER-Summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
95.
Many PSCs around the nation arguably purposefully use
methodologies to discourage QF development, such as in Montana where a
commissioner was overheard discussing tactics on how to derail QF development in
the state. See Tom Lutey, Hot Mic Records Troubling Conversation About Solar
Regulations, BILLINGS GAZETTE (June 27, 2017), http://billingsgazette.com/news/
government-and-politics/hot-mic-records-troubling-conversation-about-solar
-regulations/article_8499a49d-e281-5dd7-aae7-aecccfa0394e.html (Commissioner
Lake was caught saying, in relation to a Montana Public Service Commission order
dropping contract lengths and avoided cost for QF systems, that “the 10-year might
do it, if the price doesn’t. And at this low price I can’t imagine anyone getting into
it.”). Indeed, in a rejection of the Montana PSC’s attempts to circumvent PURPA, the
Supreme Court of Montana, in an appeal of the Montana PSC’s decision, held that
“the PSC cannot adopt a new methodology simply to circumvent PURPA’s objective
to encourage alternative energy development of small power production facilities.”
Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 981.
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losses, decreased transmission and distribution costs, shorter lead times,
increased reliability, avoidance of volatile price fluctuations inherent in
fossil fuels, and environmental and public health interests.96 Due to how
some PSCs structure their avoided cost calculations, however, DG
developers are not compensated for the benefits they provide to the utilities
and are not receiving the full avoided cost they are entitled to under
PURPA. All of the benefits that DG projects provide to utilities must be
incorporated in avoided cost calculations and it is only just and reasonable
that PSCs incorporate them in their calculations in order to comply with
PURPA’s mandate.
Methods for incorporating DG-specific benefits into avoided cost
calculations have already been developed. For example, the National
Renewable Energy Lab (“NREL”) of the United States Department of
Energy has already developed some methods for quantifying the benefits
of DG systems.97 Likewise, Michigan’s Public Service Commission has
developed methods to quantify DG benefits.98 Below are some, but not all,
of the factors that should be quantified and applied by PSCs in developing
standardized avoided cost rates for DG projects.
1. Avoided Line Losses, Reduced Congestion, and
Decreased Transmission and Distribution Costs
Since DG systems are located near where the power is used,
avoided line losses, reduced transmission line congestion, and decreased
transmission and distribution costs should be accounted for in avoided cost

96.
See Amory B. Lovins, et. al., Small is Profitable: The Hidden
Economic Benefits of Making Electrical Resources the Right Size, Rocky Mountain
Institute
(2002),
https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/RMI_Document_
Repository_Public-Reprts_U02-09_SmallIsProfitableBook.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Energy,
The Potential Benefits of Distributed Generation and Rate-Related Issues That May
Impede Their Expansion, FERC.GOV, 3–18 (Feb. 2007), https://www.energy.gov/sites/
prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/1817_Report_-final.pdf [hereinafter Potential
Benefits Report].
97.
See Paul Denholm, et. al., Methods for Analyzing the Benefits and
Costs of Distributed Photovoltaic Generation to the U.S. Electric Utility System,
NREL (Sept. 2014), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/62447.pdf.
98.
See MICH. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, Report on the MPSC Staff Study to
Develop a Cost of Service-Based Distribution Generation Program Tariff (Feb. 21,
2018),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mpsc/MPSC_Staff_DG_Report_
with_Appendices_614779_7.pdf.

222

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 44

calculations.99 On average, utilities lose about five percent of their power
due to line losses,100 and FERC has already specified that avoided costs
should be increased when the utility saves money through reduced line
losses as a result of a QF being constructed close to consumption.101
Avoidance of line losses could save utilities a substantial sum of money
annually. For example, Montana, a state that primarily relies on centralized
power, lost around 830,779 MW hours in 2019, which is equivalent to the
annual energy used by about 78,000 homes.102 Minnesota, another state
heavily dependent on centralized power, lost the around 3.63 million MW
hours in 2019, the equivalent energy of about 341,000 homes in 2016.103
Unfortunately for ratepayers, the utility shifts the costs of line
losses onto its customers, meaning ratepayers are paying for power that
they do not consume.104 DG projects minimize line losses and ultimately
deliver more power to consumers with less costs compared to centralized

99.
18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(iv) (2020); 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(2)(ii)(G)
(2020); Keyes, Fox, & Wiedman LLP, Unlocking DG Value: A PURPA-based
Approach to Promoting DG Growth, Interstate Renewable Energy Council, Inc., 5
(May 2013), https://irecusa.org/publications/unlocking-dg-value-a-purpa-based
-approach-to-promoting-dg-growth/.
100. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions: How much
electricity is lost in transmission and distribution in the United States, EIA,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=105&t=3 (last updated Jan. 29, 2018).
101. FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,214, 12,227 (Feb. 25, 1980)
(holding that “[i]f the load served by the [QF] is closer to the [QF] than it is to the
utility, it is possible that there may be net savings resulting from reduced line losses.
In such cases, the rates should be adjusted upwards.”); 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(4)
(2018).
102. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., State Electricity Profiles: Montana
Electricity Profile 2019, EIA, Table 10, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/montana/
index.php (last updated Jan. 25, 2018). The calculation is based on using EIA data that
the average home consumes 10,649 kWs annually. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Electricity Does An American Home Use, EIA,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=97&t=3 (last updated Oct. 9, 2020).
103. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., State Electricity Profiles: Minnesota
Electricity Profile 2019, EIA, Table 10, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/minnesota/
index.php (last updated Jan. 25, 2018) (Calculation is based on using EIA data that the
average home consumes 10,649 kWs annually.). See U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Electricity Does An American Home Use, EIA,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=97&t=3 (last updated Oct. 9, 2020).
104. Constellation-An Edison Company, Line Losses: Overlooked and Often
Misunderstood (June 30, 2020), https://blogs.constellation.com/energy-management/linelosses-overlooked-and-often-misunderstood/#:~:text=The%20quantity%20that%20is%
20lost,and%20passed%20on%20to%20customers.
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power.105 Methodologies for incorporating avoided line losses have
already been developed by NREL106 and PSCs should utilize NREL’s
expertise in developing avoided cost calculations that include avoided line
loss benefits of DG systems. Thus, PSCs can rely on the EIA for data
regarding line losses by state107 and use NREL’s methodologies for
calculating the benefits that a DG system provides to the utility and its
consumers to properly account for and include these cost savings that DG
systems provide to a utility.
Additionally, avoided cost rates should consider DG’s savings in
reduced congestion costs.108 Congestion costs occur when there is an
overload of energy on transmission lines.109 Costs to consumers and
utilities stemming from congestion vary by region and electricity
jurisdiction and can be substantial. For example, congestion in the
Midwest Independent System Operator territory cost consumers $1.24
billion in 2011.110 Since power supplied by DG systems is produced close
to load, there is a significant reduction in congestion costs because that
power avoids transmission lines and instead is inputted directly into local
distribution lines.111 These benefits of DG systems must be considered in
developing just and reasonable avoided cost rates.
As for transmission and distribution capacity, DG systems allow
utilities to avoid additional infrastructure typically needed when energy is
added to a utility’s system. Transmission and distribution capacity is the
cost to the utility for building new or expanding existing transmission
lines, transformers that step up electric voltage for efficient transport, and
substations that step the electric voltage down for distribution to
customers.112 There are also costs of necessary rights of way for
transmission and distributions lines.113 DG systems provide several
benefits in terms of decreasing transmission and distribution costs,
105. Potential Benefits Report, supra note 96, at 3–18; Denholm, supra
note 97, at 20.
106. Denholm, supra note 99, at 20–27.
107. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., State Electricity Profiles, EIA (Jan. 25,
2018), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/archive/2015/ (see Table 10).
108. Potential Benefits Report, supra note 96, at i, 1–11.
109. Id. at 3–8.
110. U.S. Dept. of Energy, National Electric Transmission Congestion
Study, DOE, xviii (Sept. 2015), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/09/f26/
2015%20National%20Electric%20Transmission%20Congestion%20Study_0.pdf/.
111. Potential Benefits Report, supra note 96, at 3–8.
112. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Distributed Generation of Electricity and its
Environmental Impacts, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/energy/distributed-generation
-electricity-and-its-environmental-impacts (last visited Nov. 17, 2020).
113. Potential Benefits Report, supra note 96, at 6–3 to 6–4.
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including reducing and deferring the need for upstream capacity
(centralized power systems).114 This ultimately reduces the utility’s
transmission and distribution costs by avoiding the need for transformers,
lines, substations, and new rights of way.115
Overall, to ensure that DG projects are being valued consistent
with PURPA’s requirement that rates be “just and reasonable” and be the
utility’s “full avoided cost,”116 rate calculations by state utility
commissions must incorporate the benefits of avoided line losses, reduced
congestion costs, and decreased costs associated with transmission and
distribution capacity that are avoided by DG systems. Failure to
incorporate these benefits of DG systems in avoided costs results in DG
systems being unjustly underpaid for the generation they provide to the
utility and its ratepayers. This failure leads to DG developers subsidizing
the utility, creating an unfair boon to the utility’s profit, and fails to fulfill
both PURPA’s requirement to “encourage” QF development and the
principle that ratepayers (as well as the utility) are left “indifferent” as to
the power they consume.117
2. Shorter Lead Times
Significant financial risks are associated with long lead times of
centralized power, making valuation of DG’s short lead times an important
aspect of avoided cost rate calculations.118 Lead time is the time it takes to
construct, generate, and distribute electricity from a given power plant,
and longer lead times increase costs to the utility.119 DG systems have
shorter lead times comparatively, and the three main benefits include
reducing: (1) the forecasting risks associated with uncertain future
demand; (2) the financial risk of long construction periods of larger
installations; and (3) the risk of “technological or regulatory
obsolescence.”120 FERC has already recognized that reduced lead times
may produce savings and provide utilities with the ability to adjust for
demand fluctuations through greater flexibility.121 Just and reasonable

114. Id. at 3–11.
115. Id.
116. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(1); 18 C.F.R. § 292.304.
117. S. Cal. Edison Co., 71 FERC at 62,080.
118. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(2)(vii); Lovins, supra note 96, at 117.
119. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Utility
Scale Electricity Generating Plant, EIA, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/capitalcost/
(last updated April 12, 2013).
120. Lovins, supra note 96, at 117.
121. FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,214, 12,227 (Feb. 25, 1980).

2021

LOCALIZING ENERGY INDEPENDENCE

225

avoided cost rate calculations would incorporate the benefits of DGs
shorter lead times.
3. Avoiding Volatility Risks of Fuel Prices
DG systems, such as wind and solar, do not rely on fossil fuels for
electricity generation and avoid costly risks associated with market
variations of fossil fuel costs. Natural gas and other fossil fuels carry with
them substantial financial risks due to their inherent pricing volatility and
the difficulty in forecasting prices, which results in month to month
uncertainty for electricity prices.122 Through a combination of supply
issues, increasing demand, and other factors, such as extreme weather
events shutting down production or supply chains, natural gas prices can
have drastic swings.123 Furthermore, future supply of natural gas is
debatable, with some uncertainty in supply forecasts;124 thus, if a utility is
heavily reliant on natural gas for its power it’s ratepayers bear the burden
of increased economic risk and negative impacts related to price volatility
of natural gas.
Conversely, clean energy provides a long-term stable fixed price
for consumers.125 By providing price stability to consumers, clean energy
is essentially an insurance policy that reduces risks to consumers against
increases in fossil fuel prices.126 One potential method to account for DGs’
risk reduction in avoided cost calculations would be to use the Capital
Asset Pricing Model, which is a model that describes the relationship
122. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas Spot and Future Prices, EIA,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_fut_s1_a.htm (latest update May 5, 2018).
123. Comm’n of Envtl. Cooperation, Renewable Energy as a Hedge
Against Fuel Price Fluctuation: How to Capture the Benefits, CEC, 6, 15 (2008),
http://www.cec.org/islandora/en/item/2360-renewable-energy-hedge-against-fuel
-price-fluctuation-en.pdf.
124. David Hughes, Shale Reality Check: Drilling Into the U.S.
Government’s Rosy Projections for Shale Gas & Tight Oil Production Through 2050,
Post Carbon Institute, x, 34, 159 (Winter 2018), http://www.postcarbon.org/
publications/shale-reality-check/; Richard Heinberg, Why the New EIA Forecast Is
Unrealistic, EcoWatch (Feb. 5, 2018, 11:13 AM), https://www.ecowatch.com/eia
-outlook-2018-2531592684.html.
125. Lori A. Bird, et. al., Renewable Energy Price-Stability Benefits in
Utility Green Power Programs, NREL, 1 (Aug. 2008), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy08osti/43532.pdf.
126. Id.; see also Denholm, supra note 97, at 50 (concluding: “The
addition of DGPV (or renewable energy more generally) to an electricity-generation
portfolio could result in diversity-related benefits, which include providing a physical
hedge against uncertain future fuel prices and insurance against the impact of higher
future fuel prices or changes in emissions policy.”).
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between an energy source’s risk and expected return.127 Ultimately, it is in
the utility and public’s interest that the financial risks associated with fossil
fuel systems and DG systems are incorporated in avoided cost rate
calculations.
4. The Public Interest, the Social Cost of Carbon Protocol Tool,
and the Environmental Benefits of QFs
As discussed above in part I(B)(3), the public’s interest in
decreasing the nation’s reliance on fossil fuels is not only an economic
interest, but also an environmental interest that can and should be
considered in setting avoided costs. FERC has ruled that since they are a
necessary aspect of the utility’s full avoided costs, environmental costs
related to fuel sources should be included in avoided costs calculations
when those environmental costs are incurred by the utility.128 Additionally,
as discussed above in section I(B)(3), the Supreme Court’s holdings
arguably allow for avoided cost calculations to consider other interests
beyond the economic interests of ratepayers related to merely carbon
costs.129 The social cost of carbon resulting from the climate and public
health impacts of burning fossil fuels should be considered in setting
avoided cost calculations.
Climate change—indisputably a result of fossil fuel combustion—
is already causing major negative issues in the energy sector, such as
increased power outages and supply chain disruptions that cost utilities
and consumers substantial sums of money in the form of blackouts.130
Increasing temperatures, decreasing water availability, more intense
storms and extreme weather (including more frequent polar vortexes due
to instability of jet streams caused by climate change),131 wildfires, and sea
127. Lovins, supra note 96, at 145–53.
128. So. Cal. Edison, 71 FERC ¶ 61,269, 62,080 (F.E.R.C. June 2, 1995);
see also Cal. PUC, 133 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,059, 61268 (FERC Oct. 21, 2010).
129. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 755; Am. Paper Inst., 461 U.S. at 417.
130. Carbon Disclosure Project, Global Electric Utilities: Building
business resilience to inevitable climate change, Acclimatise and IBM, Appendix 2
(2009),
https://www.ideiasustentavel.com.br/pdf/ibm_carbon_disclosure_project_
2009_electric_utilities.pdf/; U.S. Dept. of Energy, Climate Change: Effects on Our
Energy, ENERGY.GOV (July 11, 2013), https://www.energy.gov/articles/climate
-change-effects-our-energy.
131. UC Davis, Science & Climate: Polar Vortex, https://climatechange.
ucdavis.edu/climate-change-definitions/what-is-the-polar-vortex/ (last visited Apr.
28, 2021); see also Dana Nuccitelli, Climate lessons from Texas’ frozen power
outages, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (Feb. 23, 2021) https://yaleclimate
connections.org/2021/02/the-climate-lesson-from-texas-frozen-power-outages/.
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level rise are all projected to continue to negatively affect the production
and transmission of electricity in the United States with increasing
severity.132 Overall, shutdowns and disruptions related to weather have
substantial financial impacts to the public and utilities with an estimated
yearly cost ranging from $25 to $70 billion per year.133 While accounting
for carbon pricing in avoided costs, as discussed above, accounts for
potential economic-based regulations surrounding carbon emissions, there
are many other costly externalities associated with fossil fuel-based
generation that should be accounted for in avoided cost calculations so that
those calculations represent the utility’s actual full avoided costs.
Unlike centralized generation, DG systems have substantial
potential to reduce a utility’s financial impacts and risk from climaterelated extreme weather events. DG systems have been identified as a
technology that is resilient to extreme weather events and can “maintain
service and minimize system vulnerabilities” related to disruptions caused
by extreme weather.134 Thus, there is a significant economic value in the
increased reliability that DG systems provide utilities. Therefore, if the law
requires calculation of the utility’s full avoided cost, the cost savings that
DG systems provide by increasing resilience to extreme weather events
must be incorporated.
In addition to including the climate change risk avoidance benefits
of DG systems in avoided cost calculations, the public health and societal
consequences of burning fossil fuels, also known as the social cost of
carbon, should also be considered in avoided cost calculations. In order to
truly set rates in the public interest, PSCs should utilize the Social Cost of
Carbon Protocol Tool (SCC Tool) in evaluating utility resource planning
documents and proposed new generation resources. The SCC Tool “is a
measure, in dollars, of the long-term damage done by a ton of carbon
132. U.S. Dept. of Energy, U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate
Change and Extreme Weather, ENERGY.GOV, i (July 2013) https://www.energy.gov/
sites/prod/files/2013/07/f2/20130716-Energy%20Sector%20Vulnerabilities%20Report.
pdf; Carbon Disclosure Project, Global Electric Utilities: Building business resilience
to inevitable climate change, Acclimatise and IBM, Appendix 2 (2009), https://
www.2degreesnetwork.com/groups/2degrees-community/resources/carbon-disclosureproject-2008-global-electric-utilities-adaptation-challenge_2/attachments/8294/.
133. Executive Office of the President, Economic Benefits Of Increasing
Electric Grid Resilience To Weather Outages, THE WHITE HOUSE, 17 (Aug. 2013)
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/Grid%20Resiliency%20Report_
FINAL.pdf.
134. Id. at 15; U.S. Dept. of Energy, U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to
Climate Change and Extreme Weather, ENERGY.gov, 43 (July 2013) https://www.
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/07/f2/20130716-Energy%20Sector%20Vulnerabilities%
20Report.pdf.
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dioxide (CO2) emissions in a given year.”135 The SCC Tool focuses on
quantifying the climate change damage of rulemakings on the federal
level, including changes in the cost of energy.136 By using the SCC Tool,
PSCs can equate the amount of carbon dioxide that a clean energy DG
system avoids compared to other sources in their energy mix and provide
additional compensation to the DG system for helping to reduce climateassociated risks and costs for the utility.
Indeed, this is not an unprecedented idea. The Colorado PSC
recently ordered that the SCC Tool must be used to place a price on fossil
fuel resource planning proposals, including the Social Cost of Carbon of
$43 per ton beginning in 2022, increasing to $69 per ton in 2050.137 Other
PSCs throughout the nation should also rely on the SCC Tool in
quantifying the true costs of fossil fuel based resources and incorporate
those avoided costs in avoided cost calculations for clean energy projects.

B. Case Study on Avoided Cost Methodologies
Implementation of avoided cost calculations varies across the
country and from state-to-state. The rate paid to a QF must be equal to the
utilities’ full avoided costs, but due to varying methodologies used by
PSCs throughout the country, the avoided costs that DG systems provide
are not always incorporated in avoided cost calculations. While some
states arguably appear to be actively pursuing ways to decrease the
viability of qualifying DG projects,138 others have incorporated a few of
the above benefits in their standardized avoided cost rates. Michigan
recently took positive steps at implementing PURPA’s avoided cost rates
to account for the full avoided costs of DG development.

135. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Social Cost of Carbon, EPA (Jan. 19,
2017) https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon_.html.
136. Id.
137. In the Matter of Application of the Public Service Company of
Colorado for Approval of Its 2016 Electric Resource Plan, Proceeding No. 16A0396E, Decision No. C17-0316, ¶ 87 (Mar. 23, 2017).
138. Tom Lutey, Hot Mic Records Troubling Conversation About Solar
Regulations, BILLINGS GAZETTE (June 27, 2017), http://billingsgazette.com/news/
government-and-politics/hot-mic-records-troubling-conversation-about-solar-regulations/
article_8499a49d-e281-5dd7-aae7-aecccfa0394e.html; Robert Walton, Idaho Regulators
Reduce PURPA Contracts from 20 to 2 Years, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 25, 2015),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/idaho-regulators-reduce-purpa-contracts-from-20-to-2
-years/404518/.
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1. Michigan
On November 21, 2017 the Michigan Public Service Commission
(“MI-PSC”) promulgated avoided cost methodologies that account for the
fair valuation of some, but not all, of the benefits of QF DG projects.139 In
its order, the MI-PSC set the design capacity of standardized QFs at two
MW and set contract lengths for five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years, at the
QF’s option.140 Additionally, the order dictated that the appropriate
method for developing avoided cost rates is a “hybrid-proxy method.”141
This method splits avoided capacity and energy costs between two proxies,
with the former being compared to a natural gas combustion turbine
(“NGCT”) and the latter a natural gas combined cycle unit (“NGCC”).142
The hybrid-proxy method accounts for the true avoided costs of
an electric utility by assuming that if the utility only needs capacity then it
would build a NGCT “peaker” plant, whereas if it needed additional
energy it would build a NGCC plant.143 NGCT peaker plants cost the
utility more than NGCC plants, and because QF systems generally provide
incremental capacity increases, which over time result in energy increases,
a hybrid-proxy method results in avoided cost rates that better encompass
a utility’s avoided costs than simply using an NGCC as the proxy for both
energy and capacity.
Further, the MI-PSC required that avoided line losses and DG’s
value during on-peak times must be incorporated in setting avoided cost
rates.144 Overall, the total on-peak energy rate provided by the MI-PSC
ranged from $48.31 to $56.46 per MW hour over a 20-year contract,
pending on the option chosen by the QF.145 While the MI-PSC did not go
as far as to require inclusion of all of DG’s benefits in avoided cost
calculations, the MI-PSC made a step in the right direction and is
continuing to develop methods of quantifying all of DG’s benefits.146

139. MICH. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, In re Consumers Energy Company, Case
No. U-18090, 32 (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mpsc/U
-18090_11_21_2017_606668_7.pdf.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 3.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 31.
144. Id. at 27–28, 33.
145. Id. at Attachment 1, 2–3.
146. See MICH. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, Report on the MPSC Staff Study to
Develop a Cost of Service-Based Distribution Generation Program Tariff (Feb. 21,
2018), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mpsc/MPSC_Staff_DG_Report_with_
Appendices_614779_7.pdf.
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Subsequent to the November 2017 order, the MI-PSC developed
methodologies in a report to incorporate DG’s benefits in avoided cost rate
calculations.147 The MI-PSC report found that PURPA allows for PSCs to
consider more than just capacity, energy, and line loss values, including
considerations of hedge value against volatile fossil fuel prices, reduction
of air emissions, and other environmental compliance costs.148 The MIPSC report recommended that a fair valuation method for DG projects
consists of two parts: “(1) an avoided capital and energy cost; and (2) all
other avoided cost or benefit elements such as avoided distribution line
losses, transmission and distribution costs, avoided air emission and
environmental cost, the solar-fuel price hedge, and reactive supply and
voltage control.”149 The report concluded that solar DG projects provide
the following benefits: A general “value of solar” levelized capacity value
of 4.7 cents per kWh and a 20-year energy value of 5.1 cents per kWh; a
2.37 percent transmission loss factor; and a distribution line loss factor
ranging from 4.63 percent to 9.74 percent.150
Overall, with the report’s recommendations applying to cases
starting on June 1, 2018, and the MI-PSC’s stated intentions to continue
working to incorporate environmental benefits into avoided cost
calculations, the MI-PSC continues to progress towards developing
avoided cost rates that appropriately encompass DG’s many benefits. With
these developments, Michigan is poised for significant growth in DG
projects.151 Overall, the MI-PSC appears to be on the right track of
incorporating all of DG’s benefits and other PSCs around the nation should
follow and expand on MI-PSC’s lead in the effort to quantify the benefits
of DG systems. Doing so leads to better compliance with PURPA’s
mandate that QF’s be entitled to the utility’s full avoided cost.

IV. BUILDING RESILIENCY VIA COMMUNITY
POWER PROJECTS AND PURPA
While PSCs can and should use PURPA’s avoided cost
requirements to incentivize development of local DG projects, state
legislatures also have a role in increasing local clean energy development
147. Id.
148. Id. at Appendix E, 3.
149. Id. at 15.
150. Id. at Appendix E – 3.
151. Andy Balaskovitz, Advocates Say Solar Poised For Growth Under
Latest Regulatory Changes in Michigan, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Nov. 28, 2017),
http://midwestenergynews.com/2017/11/28/advocates-say-solar-poised-for-growth
-under-latest-regulatory-changes-in-michigan/.
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by promulgating legislation that enables community power DG projects.
Community power is the concept that community members own, develop,
or share in the production and/or use of clean energy primarily through
community-scale DG solar and wind projects.152 Community power
projects work by expanding access of DG power to community members
who cannot install a solar or wind systems because they are renters, have
shaded roofs or limited yard space, or are inhibited financially.153
Community power in Europe has been established for decades. Seventy to
eighty percent of wind energy projects in Denmark are owned under
community ownership, and around 50 percent of clean energy projects in
Germany under community ownership.154
The community power trend is also taking hold in the United
States. As of 2018, sixteen states had laws enabling community power in
place, and activity around community power projects is buzzing in nearly
every state.155 In addition to initiatives at the state level, action at the
federal level was recently initiated via the CLEAN Future Act, which
would explicitly amend PURPA to include language supporting the
establishment of community solar programs.156 Community power
projects not only come with the many benefits of DG projects discussed
above, including decreasing emissions, reducing consumer exposure to
volatile prices of fuel, and increasing grid reliability, but they also produce
other benefits including creation of local employment opportunities and a
revenue base for community needs.157 Overall, community power provides
significant benefits to the public, and by combining the benefits of PURPA
152. John Farrell, Beyond Sharing: How Communities Can Take Ownership
of Renewable Power, INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, 6 (April 2016)
https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Final-Beyond-Sharing-How-Communities
-Can-Take-Ownership-of-Renewable-Power.pdf; J. Roberts, et. al, Community Power:
Model legal frameworks for citizen-owned renewable energy, CLIENTEARTH, 4, (June
2014) https://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/projects/sites/iee-projects/files/projects/
documents/smodel_legal_frameworks_2014.pdf.
153. Jason Coughlin, et. al, A Guide to Community Shared Solar: Utility,
Private, and Nonprofit Project Development, NREL, 3 (May 2012),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/54570.pdf.
154. J. Roberts, supra note 152, at 6–7.
155. Interstate Renewable Energy Council, State Shared Renewable
Energy Program Catalog, IREC, https://irecusa.org/regulatory-reform/shared
-renewables/state-shared-renewable-energy-program-catalog/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2020); Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Community Power Map, ILSR,
https://ilsr.org/community-power-map/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2020).
156. See CLEAN Future Act, H.R. ____, 117th Cong. § 225 (2021).
157. John Farrell, Advantage Local: Why Local Energy Ownership
Matters, INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Sept. 2014), https://ilsr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Advantage_Local-FINAL.pdf.
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with other community power incentives in community power legislation,
states can act to encourage development and help communities realize
localized energy independence.

A. Community Power in the United States
Several states have unlocked the potential of community power
projects. As of 2020, through enabling legislation and other incentives,
total installed capacity of community solar projects was around 2,759
MWs in the United States spread around 40 different states. For
comparison, the average United States home uses around 10.7 MWs per
year.158 Over the next five years, United States community solar is
expected to increase by some 3.4 gigawatts, enough to power around
650,000 homes.159 One factor that could further increase community
power development is to allow community power developers to obtain
PURPA’s avoided cost incentives for any remaining energy that is
unsubscribed to by community members. This could provide an important
mechanism to increase independent development of community power
projects by ensuring that developers of community power projects will
receive a return on investment regardless of whether all of the power is
subscribed to by community members. By combining PURPA and
community power incentives, further growth in community solar and other
clean energy projects could be realized.
Another important overlap between community power projects
and PURPA is community electric cooperatives’ obligation to purchase
electricity from QFs that was recently clarified by FERC. Prior to 2015,
electric cooperatives’ purchase of QF energy was limited to the percent
dictated in their electricity contract with the utility that they purchase
electricity from, however, in 2015 FERC concluded that such contractual
obligations violated PURPA’s mandatory requirement for utilities to
purchase energy and capacity from QFs.160 The 2015 FERC order
effectively held that community electric cooperatives are required to
purchase energy and capacity from QFs where those projects are built,
regardless of existing contractual obligations with a utility that places
limits on the amount of power a community cooperative can generate or
158. SEIA, Community Solar, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION
(2021), https://www.seia.org/initiatives/community-solar; see also Smart Electric
Power Alliance, Community Solar Program Design Models, 6, https://sepapower.org/
resource/community-solar-program-designs-2018-version/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2021).
159. Id.
160. Delta-Montrose Electric Assn., 151 FERC ¶ 61,238, 62,584–85
(F.E.R.C. June 18, 2015).
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purchase from independent producers.161 In other words, PURPA’s QF
mandatory purchase requirements supersede other contractual obligations
that community cooperatives and utilities have, and a utility cannot
penalize an electric cooperative for fulfilling their mandate under PURPA
when a QF is developed within their electric cooperative area.162 In
essence, FERC’s order provides electric cooperatives with additional
authority to purchase power from QFs, which unleashes potential for the
development of community DG QF projects where electric cooperatives
exist.

B. Case Studies on Community Power Legislation
The following case studies provide examples of two states that
have enacted state laws enabling community power projects. While
Minnesota, Massachusetts, and New York lead the way in total installed
MW capacity of community solar programs,163 this article focuses on two
western states’ community power programs: Oregon and Colorado.
Oregon’s community power legislation provides an example for linking
PURPA’s avoided cost and community power incentives together. While
Colorado’s community power legislation does not provide a mechanism
linking PURPA’s incentives, it does include important provisions that
should be expanded by Oregon and other states. In addition to Oregon and
Colorado, Minnesota also provides a good example of community solar
legislation, but is not the focus of this paper.164
While the following examples apply to two and three MW
projects, to further incentivize community power projects, the generating
capacity for community power projects should be expanded to a minimum
of ten MWs, as this size has been found to achieve the lowest installed cost
for consumers based on economies of scale evaluations.165 Additionally,
community power legislation should consider expanding community
power programs to other clean sources of energy rather than limiting the
program to solely solar. Overall, while there is always room for

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Institute for Local Self-Reliance, National Community Solar
Programs Tracker (Mar. 2, 2021), https://ilsr.org/national-community-solar
-programs-tracker/.
164. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1641 (2013).
165. John Farrell, Is Bigger Best in Renewable Energy?, INSTITUTE FOR
LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, 19 (Sept. 2016), https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/
Is-Bigger-Best-in-Renewable-Energy-Report-Final.pdf.
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improvement, these two states provide good insight into how community
power legislation can be structured.
1. Oregon
In March 2016, the Oregon Legislature passed Senate Bill 1547
(hereafter, “Community Solar Bill”), which enabled development of
community solar projects.166 The Community Solar Bill delegated
rulemaking authority to the Oregon Public Utility Commission (OR-PUC)
to establish rules for the “procurement of electricity from community solar
projects.”167 The Community Solar Bill directs the OR-PUC to establish
project capacity requirements, certify projects, prescribe application
processes, and require electric utilities to enter into 20-year power
purchase agreements with qualifying projects.168 Additionally, the ORPUC is required to adopt rules that protect the public interest, incentivize
ownership or subscription of community power projects, minimize costshifting from program ratepayers to ratepayers not involved, and protect
participants from undue hardship when an electric utility is the owner of
the community power project.169
Further, the Community Solar Bill sets baseline parameters for
project participation, including that the project must have a minimum
capacity of 25 kWs and must be located in Oregon.170 Similar to PURPA’s
avoided costs, the Bill benefits community participants by requiring
utilities to provide bill credits according to the electricity generated by the
participant at the resource value of solar at the time the PPA is entered into
or through a rate adopted by the OR-PUC, if it has good cause to adopt a
different rate.171 These bill credits are similar to avoided costs, however,
they take a resource specific approach in their credits as they provide
credits based on the value of solar, not a different fuel source as a proxy,
as is often done in avoided cost calculations.
As a result of the passage of the Community Solar Bill, in June of
2017, the OR-PUC promulgated a rulemaking outlining the framework of
the program, which is briefly summarized below with a focus on how the
OR-PUC’s order connects PURPA’s avoided cost incentives with the Bill.
To obtain certification as a community solar project, the project must have
166. 2016 OR. LAWS 1547 §§ 22 et. seq. (codified at OR. REV. STAT. §
757.386 (2016)).
167. Id. at § 22(2)(a).
168. Id. at § 22(2)(a)(A)–(D).
169. Id.
170. Id. at § 22(3)(a)–(c).
171. Id. at § 22(6)(a)–(b).
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subscription to at least 50 percent of the project’s stated capacity.172 The
OR-PUC adopted the 50 percent subscription and also removed a
provision that limited the sale of unsold or unsubscribed generation to 10
percent. Importantly, the OR-PUC ordered that any unsold or
unsubscribed to generation must be purchased by the utility at the PURPA
avoided cost rate.173 The OR-PUC also required a utility to enter into a 20year PPA to purchase any unsold or unsubscribed generation.174 This
action by the OR-PUC has significant potential to increase development
of community solar projects by independent developers because it
provides independent developers with a financial incentive to develop
projects, allowing that the project’s generation is not entirely subscribed
to.
In addition to providing PURPA’s avoided cost incentives, the
OR-PUC took several other actions in its order. The OR-PUC set the initial
program capacity at 2.5 percent of each of Oregon’s three investor-owned
utilities system capacity, which adds up to a total of 160 MW, however,
they reserved the right to adjust all aspects of the program.175 On the
project level, the OR-PUC limited development to three MWs or less per
project and required that participants of the project be located in the
utility’s service territory.176 Participant ownership or subscription may not
exceed the customer’s average annual electricity consumption in the
service territory, nor may their interest or subscription exceed forty percent
of the project’s capacity.177 Further, participants may not own or subscribe
to more than two MWs across multiple projects or, when in combination
with affiliates, a total of four MWs.178
Furthermore, the electric utilities that have a community project
in its service territory are required to make payments in the form of net
metering to the project participants.179 As for siting requirements, the only
requirement is that the project be located within the Oregon territory of a
utility and be less than three MWs.180 Additionally, the OR-PUC’s order
included a low-income requirement, providing that at least ten percent of
the project’s generating capacity be allocated to low-income residents and
172. OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, In the Matter of Rules Regarding Comm.
Solar Projects, Order No. 17232, Appendix A 4–5 (June 29, 2017),
http://apps.puc.state.or.us/orders/2017ords/17-232.pdf.
173. Id. at 7.
174. Id. at Appendix A 10.
175. Id. at Appendix A 5.
176. Id. at Appendix A 6.
177. Id. at Appendix A 7.
178. Id.
179. Id. at Appendix A 8–9.
180. Id. at Appendix A 6.
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provided the authority of the OR-PUC to develop a funding mechanism
for low-income residents to become involved in the program.181
Overall, Oregon’s Community Solar Bill does a good job at
blending PURPA’s avoided cost incentives and community solar program
incentives. The mechanism that allows for up to 50 percent of any unsold
or unsubscribed to generation to be sold by the developer at the PURPA
avoided cost rate could act to increase interest and investment in local
community solar projects by independent developers, as it should provide
a further economic incentive for independent developers to get involved
in community solar programs by minimizing risk and increasing return on
investment prospects. Further, requiring a 20-year contract allows better
access to finances and investment for developers of community solar
projects. In addition to the above OR-PSC’s order that provides a general
framework for how the Community Solar Bill will be ran, further details
on the program have been developed by the OR-PUC in the Community
Solar Program Implementation Manual.182 As of February 2021, the ORPUC had approved three community solar projects to begin operation.183
While Oregon’s PURPA provision in its Community Solar Bill is
a provision that should be included in community power legislation, the
ultimate impact of such a provision, if incorporated in other states, is
highly dependent on how avoided costs are calculated and whether they
account for DG’s many benefits.
2. Colorado
In 2010, Colorado enacted its Community Solar Gardens Act
(“CSGA”) and recently expanded the scope of the CSGA to include other
forms of clean energy.184 The CSGA has been very successful in
incentivizing growth of community solar projects with 70 projects in
operation, totaling more than 50 MWs.185 The CSGA’s purpose is to
encourage investment and authorize the creation of community solar
181. Id. at 11.
182. Oregon Community Solar Program, Program Implementation
Manual (2019), https://orcsp.mendixcloud.com/p/ProgramImplementationManual/.
183. Oregon Community Solar Program, OPUC Certifies First Oregon
Community Solar Projects (Feb. 12, 2021), https://orcsp.mendixcloud.com/p/home.
184. 2010 COLO. SESS. LAWS Ch. 344 (H.B. 10-1342), http://www.leg.
state.co.us/clics/clics2010a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont/490C49EE6BEA3295872576A80026B
C4B?Open&file=1342_01.pdf (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-127 (2015));
2015 COLO. SESS. LAWS Ch. 142 (S.B. 15-046).
185. Colorado Energy Office, Community Solar, COLORADO.GOV,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/energyoffice/community-solar (last visited Nov.
17, 2020).
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projects.186 The CSGA recognizes that local communities benefit from the
development of local clean energy projects and that community
participation in solar generation is in the public interest.187
The CSGA has some similarities and many differences when
compared to Oregon’s Community Solar Bill. The CSGA outlines that
certified projects can only be two MWs or less (unlike Oregon’s three
MWs) and are owned by ten or more customers at a shared location.188
Additionally,
unlike
Oregon’s
limitations
on
size
of
ownership/subscription to the participants’ average annual electricity
consumption or 40 percent of the total project generation, the CSGA
allows participants to have ownership/subscription up to 120 percent of
the participants’ average annual electric consumption.189 Similar to the
Oregon Bill, the CSGA also provides that organizations and companies
may participate in community solar gardens.190 Further, like the Oregon
Bill, the CSGA also directs the CO-PUC to encourage participation in the
program by low income residents.191
As for providing incentives for independent developers to build
community clean energy projects, the CSGA and the CO-PUC took a
different strategy than Oregon. For unsubscribed generation at community
projects, the CSGA requires the utility to purchase the unsubscribed
generation and renewable energy credits at the utility’s incremental hourly
electricity cost during the preceding year.192 In August 2011, the CO-PUC
specifically ordered that the developer of the community solar garden may
contract with the utility for the sale of any unsubscribed generation.193 In
other words, the rate appears to be effectively somewhat of an as-available
rate based on the data on the hourly cost of energy during the preceding

186. 2010 COLO. SESS. LAWS Ch. 344 (H.B. 10-1342), http://www.leg.
state.co.us/clics/clics2010a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont/490C49EE6BEA3295872576A80026B
C4B?Open&file=1342_01.pdf (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-127 (2015)).
187. Id. at Sec. 1.
188. Id. at Bill Summary.
189. Id. at Sec. 1.
190. Id.
191. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-127(5)(a)(III)(A)–(D).
192. Id. at § 40-2-127(5)(d)–(e).
193. COLO. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, In the Matter of Proposed Amendments
to the Rules of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission Pursuant to (1) the
Development Of Solar Gardens as Required By Hb10-1342, (2) Community-Based
Projects that Qualify for Special Treatment Under HB10-1418, and (3) Use of Eligible
Energy Resources to Offset Electrical Energy Consumption of the Division of Parks
and Outdoor Recreation as per HB10-1349, Docket No. 10R-674E, Decision No. R110784, ¶¶ 189–96 (July 25, 2011), https://www.sos.state.co.us/CCR/Upload/
AGORequest/BasisandPurposeAttachment2011-00029.PDF.
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year, unlike the OR-PUC that simply required unsubscribed generation be
sold at PURPA’s standard avoided cost rate. For a community solar project
that is two MWs or less, the as available rate based on one-year of data,
rather than the avoided cost rate under PURPA, may present some barriers
to the developer in obtaining a sufficient rate for the unsubscribed
generation that allows for adequate assurances of return on investment.
In determining customer payments, the CSGA takes a different
approach than the Oregon’s Community Solar Program. The CSGA
provides net-metering payments to customers by multiplying the
subscriber’s share of the electricity production by the retail rate per kW
hour of the electric utility, minus a reasonable charge as determined by the
CO-PUC to cover distribution, integration, and administration costs of the
solar garden by the utility.194 Additionally, the CSGA requires certain
responsibilities for the owner of the solar garden, such as sharing real-time
data with the electric utility and information on the percentage of shares
that should be used for determining net metering credits.195
Overall, the CSGA program has been successful and provides
another good example for developing community solar legislation.
However, the CSGA and the CO-PUC could work to increase the
connection to PURPA’s avoided costs, which could provide further
incentives for community solar projects in Colorado. Potentially, by
requiring standardized avoided cost rates be applied to the sale of
unsubscribed generation instead of being based on one-year of as-available
hourly data of the applicable utility, the CSGA, depending on how COPUC calculates avoided cost rates, could further increase development of
community solar projects in Colorado.

V. CONCLUSION
By accounting for the full benefits of local distributed generation
clean energy projects in PURPA’s avoided cost calculations and enacting
community power legislation, states throughout the country can realize
localized energy independence and increase grid resiliency and reliability.
PSCs have a critical role in incentivizing development of DG projects by
ensuring that they are implementing avoided cost methodologies that
account for all of DGs benefits and allow for those projects to be
compensated at the utility’s full avoided cost rate as PURPA requires.
PSCs should conduct studies, similar to that done by the Michigan PSC,
and enact orders that require avoided cost calculations incorporate all of

194.
195.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-127(5)(b)(II).
Id. at § 40-2-127(5)(d)–(e).
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DG’s benefits. State legislatures likewise have the opportunity to build
upon efforts by PSCs through promulgating statutes that enable and
incentivize development of community power projects. Specifically, state
legislatures should enact legislation that incentivizes community power
development by independent developers through making PURPA’s
avoided cost benefits available for community power projects where
unsubscribed energy is present. Overall, together, PSCs and state
legislatures, along with FERC, are the key to enabling further localized
energy independence that would lead to a clean, reliable, and resilient
energy grid.
While the conclusions and recommendations in this article remain
important moving forward with broader integration and development of
local DG clean energy projects, there are several unknowns that could
positively or negatively impact the conclusions and recommendations of
this paper. Areas of consideration moving forward related to PURPA and
community power programs include Congress’ consideration to amend
PURPA,196 whether FERC Order No. 872 survives the various legal
challenges, as well as the potential rescinding of the rule as a result of
changes to the make-up of the five-member panel of FERC upcoming in
June 2021, and whether the CLEAN Future Act proposed in the United
States Congress is passed. An additional variable that could serve to
increase QF development throughout the United States is the increase in
energy storage technologies and the coupling of QF energy with storage.197
Moreover, an additional and significant hurdle to expanded QF
development is continued negative actions by state PSCs including
shortening contract lengths, relying on avoided cost methodologies that
fail to account for a QF’s full avoided costs, and including excessive
deductions to avoided costs that all have the combined effect of killing the
development prospects of QF projects.
Ultimately, time will tell whether regulatory bodies around the
nation will take the necessary steps—and importantly, work cooperatively
together—to further enable the development of clean, reliable, and
resilient distributed generation projects so as to achieve local energy
independence, or if those regulatory bodies will dig their heels in and force
communities to remain stuck in the past with expensive centralized, fossil
fuel-based energy along with its numerous economic, environmental, and
196. Am. Pub. Power Ass’n, House member introduces bill to reform
PURPA, PUBLIC POWER (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.publicpower.org/
periodical/article/house-member-introduces-bill-reform-purpa.
197. NC Clean Energy Technology Center, Three Trends in State PURPA
Implementation (May 27, 2020), https://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/2020/05/27/three
-trends-in-state-purpa-implementation/.
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public health consequences. The next few years should provide significant
insight into the future of electricity in communities throughout the United
States, and ideally—for the good of our environment, public health, grid
reliability and resiliency—that future contains an emphasis on localized
energy independence.

